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BEHAVIORAL ANALYTICS FOR FIREWALL POLICY RECOMMENDATION 
AND TUNING 
 





Techniques are described herein for optimizing rules created on a firewall / 
intrusion prevention system to ensure that they stay relevant and updated. This may be 
achieved by leveraging network observables generated at a management center. These 
techniques are useful because behavior analytics associated with the user access of network 
is crucial in creating these rules. 
 
DETAILED DESCRIPTION 
Creating rules on a firewall is a complex task. The number of network and threat 
parameters vary for each traffic pattern in the network. This makes network administration 
very challenging. Currently, the network administrator creates a rule based on known Layer 
2 (L2) – Layer 7 (L7) parameters without any insights into user traffic profile. This may 
often lead to failed audits because of generic rules present in the configuration. This can 
also lead to security holes in the configuration that can be leveraged by adversaries to gain 
access and compromise the network. 
Management centers may provide insights into data pertaining to applications 
(client and server), intrusion prevent system events, the operating system, Uniform 
Resource Locators (URLs), file downloads by specific users in the network, etc. However, 
there is no viable mechanism available to leverage this information to generate a 
recommendation for access rule creation. 
At the data collection stage, the management center may build the profile for the 
user. The profile may include the network observables that are reported by the management 
center. The observables may include networks accessed, URLs accessed, applications used, 
files downloaded, and intrusion and malware events triggered. Data may be collected when 
a threat defense module is running in learning or inline mode. 
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A profile-to-rule recommendation may be provided. The existing rule base may 
investigate the existing rule base using the available data. For the user present in the rule, 
the observables may be examined to determine whether the existing rule is 
permitting/denying the traffic. If the permit rule is a generic rule, the generated 
recommendation may be specific to the networks/URLs/applications that have been 
historically accessed. Based on the insights generated for the user pertaining to intrusion 
prevention signatures and observed malware threats, the security association of intrusion 
prevention policies and malware policies may be recommended. It will be appreciated that 
the intrusion prevention policy may not be a generic intrusion prevention policy, and may 
instead be specific to the user traffic profile. 
The user profile may be built based on network access. The user profile may be 
used to recommend rules for the network administrator. A user profile may be built based 
on source Internet Protocol (IP) address or username as the key. A profile associated with 
the user may include networks accessed, URLs accessed, applications used, files 
downloaded, and/or intrusion and malware events. Once the profile has been built for the 
user based on these parameters, the next step is to generate recommendations for rule 
updates/modification. 
A rule recommendation may be generated by reading the existing rule base and 
mapping the user profile created with the rule base to recommend updates. The "scan rule 
base" module may read through all the existing rules and categorize them into different 
types based on the parameters used in their configuration. A rule may be created at the 
management center using one or more of the following parameters: Layer 3 (L3) 
parameters (e.g., source/destination network), Layer 4 (L4) parameters (e.g., 
source/destination ports), L2 parameters (e.g., source/destination Virtual Local Area 
Networks (VLANs)), zones (e.g., source/destination), URL (e.g., custom/categories), 
application detectors, and user information (e.g., based on user, group, or Security Group 
Tag (SGT)). 
Based on the parameters that are used to configure the rules, they may be 
categorized so that it becomes easier or more efficient to map them against built-in user 
profiles. The user profile may be scanned to match the rules that are present in the 
configuration. Once a rule is found that matches the user profile, the parameters within the 
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user profile may be examined to identify the behavior pattern. Based on the behavior 
pattern for the user profile, a recommendation may be made for a change in a rule by 
restricting the rule to specific network access. Additionally, if the user profile has triggers 
for intrusion and malware, a recommendation may be made for association of the intrusion 
prevention / malware analysis profile. The recommendations may not be deployed/applied 
to the device, but a network administrator may use/leverage the recommendation. 
Figure 1 below illustrates an example of a pre-existing ruleset on a device. Here, 
the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) interface is connected to the firewall. 
 
Figure 1 
In one example scenario, a server hosts a webpage at http://example1.com. Rule 3 
exists in order to allow external users on the Internet to connect to this web server on 
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) port 80. However, on most occasions, customers 
tend to deploy rules which only specify layer 3 and layer 4 parameters, as is the case with 
rule 3. The solution described herein examines all traffic profiles destined to 172.16.1.100 
and identifies all traffic limited to only http://example1.com. With this analysis, a 
recommendation may be made to specify a URL of example1.com to rule 3. 
For the same rule, an intrusion prevention policy may be detected and applied with 
a default set of signatures enabled. With the aforementioned analysis concluding that this 
is primarily Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) 1.1 traffic destined to the server at 
172.16.1.100 running a specific version of software, a recommendation of a customized 
intrusion prevention policy may be made that only has rules enabled for HTTP and the 
specific version of software, and has all the other rules disabled. Existing approaches use 
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intrusion prevention rule recommendations but those are system-wide rule 
recommendations affecting all traffic. The techniques described herein provide a per-rule 
and per-endpoint traffic profile based rule recommendations including custom intrusion 
prevention rules for each host. 
In another example scenario, the subnetwork under consideration may be 
10.1.1.0/24. One specific host in this subnetwork, 10.1.1.1, may generate network traffic 
to obtain access to URLs "example2.com" and "example3.com," to use a given application 
to place a video call, and to generate an intrusion prevention signature alert while accessing 
a server 172.16.1.100. If the host 10.1.1.1 attempts to access the URL "example3.com" this 
is allowed by rule number 4, which does not affect the intrusion prevention policy. 
Based on the generated data, a profile may be built for host 10.1.1.1 that takes into 
consideration the network activity for the host 10.1.1.1. In this example, the host only 
accessed URLs "example2.com" and "example3.com," the given application was used by 
the host, and an intrusion prevention event was generated by the host when access occurred. 
An example profile may appear as follows: 
10.1.1.1 
{ 
URL: example2.com, example3.com 
Application: [given application] 
Intrusion prevention event generated: Yes, (signature id: 12345) 
} 
 
In the existing rule lookup phase, it may be determined that there are two rules 
which are relevant to the host 10.1.1.1 from the present rule set. Rule 1 applies if the host 
attempts to access an email service, rule 2 applies if the accessed URL is 
www.example4.com, rule 3 applies if the host is trying to access 172.16.1.100, and rule 4 
applies for all the network traffic access. Rule 4 is generic and does not have an associated 
intrusion prevention policy. 
In the generate recommendation phase, website access for the host should be 
limited to "example2.com" and "example3.com" rather than generic rule 4 which provides 
open access. The given application is being used by the host, and hence a specific rule is 
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to be created which allows only this application. Since the intrusion prevention event is 
generated by the host, the intrusion prevention system may be associated with all rules 
where host 10.1.1.1 is relevant (in this case rules 1 and 4). 
Figure 2 below illustrates an example of a ruleset on a device in accordance with 
the techniques described herein. 
 
Figure 2 
Comparing Figures 1 and 2, it is clear that the rule set has become more specific 
based on traffic profiles for the actual endpoints, be they clients or servers. Only 
recommendations are shown which are based on Layer 3 and Layer 4 parameters, URLs 
accessed, applications used, and intrusion prevention. Other parameters may also be used, 
such as user identities and group, file-based policies, VLANs, etc. 
Techniques described herein may involve building a traffic profile for every 
endpoint, using the profile to compare against the existing rule set, and generating the 
recommended rule set based on the aforementioned analysis. Individually, there are 
systems that build traffic profiles and there are separate systems for rule optimization. 
However, traffic profiles are not associated with rule recommendations beyond Layer 3 
and Layer 4 parameters on a system. In addition, the solution may be extended to improve 
the security posture by recommending more specific policies based on the results of the 
behavioral analysis of users. For example, the system may recommend intrusion rules that 
cover only the nature of applications accessed by users, characteristics of the endpoint(s) 
used by the user, etc. 
Rule explosion (e.g., increasing the number of rules from four to seven, as shown 
above) for increasing numbers of endpoints is not a concern. Multiple endpoints may have 
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similar traffic profiles and may fall under the same group of users. Such endpoints may be 
categorized as being associated with the same application/operating system. Thus, the 
generated recommendation may be optimized. 
In summary, techniques are described herein for optimizing rules created on a 
firewall / intrusion prevention system to ensure that they stay relevant and updated. This 
may be achieved by leveraging network observables generated at a management center. 
These techniques are useful because behavior analytics associated with the user access of 
network is crucial in creating these rules. 
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